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1. Introduction 
 
The leading objective of this book is to ascertain whether the notion of ‘European good governance’ 
offers operational parameters for policy practice and for institutional relations within the EU, between 
the EU and its member states, and between European governments and European civil societies. This 
contribution is especially concerned with the question of whether the concept of good governance is 
relevant to European Environmental Law and, if so, in what sense and to what extent. 
 
1.1 Relevance of the White Paper 
 
The White Paper calls for a renewal of the ‘Community method’ by advocating less of a ‘top-down 
approach and an expansion of its policy tools with non-legislative instruments’.1 This approach could 
well have a bearing on environmental policies as we find that new instruments such as subsidies, 
taxation and tradable pollution rights, as well as gentlemen’s agreements, benchmarking and auditing 
are being introduced within this sector.2 
The White Paper presents five underlying principles of good governance: openness; participation; 
accountability; effectiveness; and coherence. Again, one can well imagine that these principles are 
relevant to environmental policies. Openness and participation, for instance, relate to the Directives on 
public access to information on the environment,3 on environmental impact assessment (EIA)4 and on 
integrated pollution prevention control (IPPC)5 and the regulation on the European Environment 
Agency.6 Likewise, the principle of Coherence has a bearing on Article 6 EC, which states that 
‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of 
the Community policies (…).’ 
                                                 
1 White Paper, p. 4 (see also p. 8). 
2 Note the Fifth Environmental Action Programme (EAP), which will be discussed later in this contribution. 
3 Directive 2003/4, (2003) OJ L 41. 
4 Directive 85/337, (1997) OJ L 73/5 (amended). 
5 Directive 96/61, (1996) OJ L 257/26 (amended). 
6  (1999) OJ L 117/1. 
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1.2 Focus on Legal Policies 
 
All in all, a sufficient basis for further analysis. In this contribution the analysis will focus on the choice 
of legal policies in environmental law. That is to say on the specific choice of and the (possible) 
guidelines in the use of (binding) legal instruments. This objective requires research to be conducted 
into the (possible) match between the Commission’s ‘principles of good governance’, on the one hand, 
and the legal cornerstones of and existing legal policy practices in environmental law in Europe, on the 
other.  
With regard to ‘legal cornerstones’ we will focus on relevant primary EC law, such as the 
provisions of Article 2 (‘… a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment’), Article 3 (‘A policy in the sphere of the environment’), Article 6 (the aforementioned 
integration principle), Article 174 (objectives, aims, principles, relevant data and international 
agreements with regard to Community environmental policies), arts. 175 and 176 (concerning voting 
procedures and the right to retain or introduce unilateral measures), as well as the notion of 
sustainable development (Art. 2 EC and Art. B of the EU Treaty: ‘… and to achieve balanced and 
sustainable development,…’). One can imagine that these primary ‘cornerstones’ of EU environmental 
law offer a basis for a specified range of ‘appropriate environmental policy-practices’, in which certain 
legal instruments may or may not play a part (or only under certain premises or conditions).  
Research into the relationship between the Commission’s principles of good governance and the 
environmental legal policies that are being pursued or are presently in preparation, requires a closer 
look at the main environmental measures (such as directives) and programmes (mainly the EAPs) that 
have been put forward by the EC. Both horizontal or non-sectoral legislation and key vertical or 
sectoral legislation offer an interesting perspective as instances of legal policy making – especially 
with a view to what types of legislation are being used, such as framework directives, directives that 
leave room for implementation by co-regulation, resolutions, and white and green papers.  
With these (above) approaches there is a focus on the EC level. Clearly the White Paper also 
includes the level of global, national, regional and local authorities.7 It will not be possible to address 
all of these levels in this contribution, however. Because the success of legal policies primarily rests 
with implementation on the national level, a concise analysis will be presented of some trends in 
member states’ environmental law in conjunction with legal policy choices on the Community level.8 
 
1.3 Perspective 
 
This contribution aims to present a broad view rather than an in-depth analysis of good governance 
and environmental law in Europe. The function of the contributions on substantive issues in this book 
is to determine whether the notion of good governance strikes a chord in these areas. This 
contribution is therefore not primarily meant to serve environmental law experts, but rather those 
members of the general legal public who are interested in matters of governance and law.9 
The subtitle ‘work in progress’ might be taken to suggest that the principles and initiatives in the 
White Paper are still far removed from today’s environmental policy making. It can also be taken to 
imply that environmental legal policy making has been a ‘front runner’ in opening up the perspective of 
good governance, albeit that the goals have not yet been achieved. Thus an analysis of environmental 
legal policy making could be interesting in the sense that it offers a view on how the principles of good 
governance function in practice and will hopefully serve to show which of the two interpretations holds 
true.  
                                                 
7 White Paper, p. 10. 
8 The observations in this regard are mainly been derived from R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. 
Deketelaere (eds.), Public Environmental Law in the European Union and the United States, A Comparative 
Analysis, Deventer, Kluwer Law International 2002, especially the chapter on comparative remarks. 
9 For this reason this contribution relies more heavily on the corpus of existing law (‘that which is already 
there’). 
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Firstly, however, we will look at how we must understand the notion of governance and indeed 
the notion of good governance, in order to fine-tune this article’s contribution (see § 2). Then we will 
analyse the environmental legal cornerstones and legal policy practice (in § 3 to § 6) against the 
backdrop of the five main principles of good governance. In view of these findings a conclusion will be 
drawn (in  
§ 7) as to whether we are witnessing a shift in European environmental governance and how the 
results of the analysis relate to the (possible) future framework of the EU draft constitution. 
 
2. Good Governance 
The aim of first addressing the notion of good governance in a more general way is to obtain a clearer 
picture of what we should be looking for when comparing the Commission’s approach with the 
cornerstones and practices of environmental law in Europe.  
 
2.1 The Principles of Good Governance 
 
The White Paper lists five principles underlying the notion of good governance (on the basis of 
democracy and the rule of law) at all levels of government:10 1) Openness, which primarily means 
active communication by the institutions and making governmental decisions more accessible and 
better understandable; 2) participation, mainly by ensuring wide involvement throughout the whole 
policy chain; 3) accountability, which entails that institutions and member states explain their actions 
and take the necessary responsibility for such actions; 4) effectiveness, requiring that policies are 
effective and timely, with clear objectives, an evaluation of their future and past impact, and are 
pursued at the proper level and implemented in a proportionate way; 5) coherence, necessitating that 
policies and actions cross the boundaries of sectoral policies, are performed with a clear view as to 
overall consistency and are more easily understood. 
Furthermore, the White Paper suggests a number of proposals for change: 1) better involvement 
in shaping and implementing EU policies; 2) improving the quality and enforcement of EU policies; 3) a 
stronger link between European governance and the rest of the world; 4) refocusing the role of the 
institutions.11 
 
2.2. The Concept of Good Governance 
The White Paper offers little clarity concerning the concept of governance:  
‘“Governance” means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are 
exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence’.12 
The core element in governance seems to be the (closer) relationship between government and civil 
society. It takes a ‘joint venture’ between government and society to set and to implement policy 
targets. In this respect, according to the White Paper, ‘…, people have disappointed expectations but 
expectations nevertheless’. Therefore, ‘A better use of powers should connect the EU more closely to 
its citizens and lead to more effective policies.’ This reflects the current view of many democratic 
welfare states that the relationship between government and society has shifted from a top-down 
                                                 
10 Ibidem. 
11 White Paper, p. 11. 
12 White Paper, p. 8, n. 1. 
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(vertical) relationship to a reciprocal (or more horizontal) one. In legal terms the primacy of collective 
decision making may still rest with governments, but the choice of policies, with regard to both the 
targets and the means of achieving such targets and their implementation, require a ‘closer harmony’ 
with those members of society that are mainly involved. Organizations representing civil society13 
mobilize people and support. Moreover, they can serve as an early warning system for political 
debate. The EU wants to encourage the development of civil society and expects organizations 
representing civil society to follow the principles of good governance.14 
 
2.3 The Theory of Good Governance 
 
If the White Paper aims to renew of the Community method then we need to reflect somewhat more 
closely on the types of governance and the shifts therein as presented in the academic literature.  
In a strategic study commissioned by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
(NWO), entitled: ‘Shifts in governance: Problems of Legitimacy and Accountability’, Van Kersbergen 
and Van Waarden presented an overview of the various strands in the academic governance 
discourse.15 The authors discuss changes in governance concerning the fact that traditional ways of 
governing society, politics and the economy are changing. These changes take place in various forms 
in location, in capabilities and in styles of governance. It is interesting to note the different meanings 
given to the concept of governance in the literature, with a view to questions of legitimacy and 
accountability:16 firstly, governance as in good governance, secondly, governance as in Governing 
without Government, and thirdly, governance in Neo-Institutional Economics. 
Good governance in the ‘World Bank view’ refers to a sound and sustainable economic 
development, efficient government, effective civil society and a successful private sector, based on a 
participatory and liberal democratic tradition, equity, equality and the rule of law. In both the private 
and the public sector, we find strands of this good governance concept.17 
Governing without government is often used with reference to global governance, considering the 
non-hierarchical relations between interdependent states. In networks theory we find this concept in 
relation to the idea of governance taking place in pluricentric networks, in contrast to multicentric 
(market) and unicentric (hierarchical/state) forms of governance, and also in multi-level governance 
(both in intrastate and/or international relations).18 
Neo-institutional economics emphasizes that markets are not spontaneous social orders but are 
created and maintained by institutions laying down and enforcing the basic rules of the game and 
structuring incentives. Economic transactions are not only governed by governments but by all kinds of 
governance structures, whose mechanisms are subject to renewed study. 
 
2.4 Shifts? 
 
Unfortunately the White Paper does not explicitly link its definition of governance to any of the above 
strands of academic literature. In my view, however, the ‘World Bank view’ seems closest to the 
Commission’s objectives, especially with regard to the stronger involvement of citizens and civil 
society in EU policy making and policy implementation. This view also holds true, if we compare the 
White Paper proposals with some of the so-called ‘shifts in governance’, that is to say changes in 
                                                 
13 See for a definition, White Paper, p. 14, n. 9. 
14 White Paper, p. 15. 
15 K. van Kersbergen and F. van Waarden, Shifts in Governance: Problems of Legitimacy and Accountability, 
Paper on the theme ‘Shifts in Governance’ as part of the NOW’s Strategic Plan 2002-2005, July 2001, p. 4-
77.  
16 Ibidem, p. 15. Note that I have taken the liberty of regrouping their presentation in three main clusters. 
17 Under the heading of corporate governance and new public management. 
18 Governing without governments is also a key issue with reference to the ability of civil society, especially of 
local societies, to self-organize and self-manage their common pool resources and prevent their depletion. 
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types or styles, models or modes of governance, also presented in Van Kersbergen and Van 
Waarden’s article.19 
Clearly, although the right to a judicial review is a baseline for the White Paper,20 the ‘shift from 
governmental to court governance’ is not an objective of the White Paper. The same applies to the 
‘shift from governance through public to governance through semi-public organizations’ – although the 
White Paper does propose an increase in the number of regulatory agencies. However, this is limited 
to areas where one single public interest is predominant and the choices available have little or no 
political content.21 
Furthermore, the White Paper highlights the need to reinforce the ‘culture of consultation and 
dialogue’22 and the Commission advocates that civil society must itself follow the principles of good 
governance,23 if only to offer a basis for co-regulation.24 A ‘shift from governance by public to 
governance by private organizations’, however, is not the objective of the White Paper, but, at its best, 
it aims to renew the Community method by ‘[…] the refocusing of the Institutions [...]’.25 
For that same reason one could argue that a ‘shift from government to network governance’ does 
not seem to feature in the White Paper’s plans. Clearly the Commission’s objective of ‘renewal’ is not 
a project leading up to shared legal powers with civil society actors. Even co-regulation is proposed 
under the firm condition that ‘[...] a framework of overall objectives, basic rights, enforcement and 
appeal mechanisms, and conditions for monitoring compliance is set in the legislation.’26 Still, the 
White Paper does indeed propose a closer linkage between EU institutions (and member states’ 
governments), on the one hand, and civil society, on the other. Such a closer link can only be 
achieved through, amongst other things, more openness and more room for participation. It requires 
opening up towards society and considering it to be a more trustworthy partner in collective decision 
making. This would amount to pluricentrism only in the more moderate sense of agreeing that 
‘governments in Europe’ need to interact and indeed co-operate in social networks and should 
promote the existence of such networks. 
 
2.5 Focus 
 
The White Paper does not propose a revolutionary shift. That, however, is not to say that its main 
objective of a closer relationship between governments in Europe and Europe’s civil societies, 
embedded in a notion of good government that is similar to the World Bank’s perspective, should not 
be taken seriously.  
In the following analysis this ‘closer relationship’ offers an important viewpoint as regards 
environmental law in Europe. An attempt will be made to determine if the good governance approach 
reaches beyond the scope of ‘more interaction’ and extends to neo-institutional governance which 
involves the introduction of innovative legal policies in the shape of new environmental policy 
instruments. Is there a move towards ‘market-based instruments’ that appeal to a ‘shared 
responsibility’ (such as ‘economic’ or indirect and ‘suasive’ or self-regulatory instruments), away from 
or in addition to command and control (or direct/top-down) regulation?27 The outcome of this analysis 
will – hopefully – add to a better understanding of the White Paper’s principles of good governance 
and offer a position for a (critical) appraisal of the EU draft Constitution. 
                                                 
19 Ibidem, p. 29–50. 
20 If only because it follows on from the (explicitly adhered to) rule of law. 
21 The present EEA (European Environmental Agency) does not belong to this category. 
22 Ibidem, p. 16. 
23 Ibidem, p. 15. 
24 Ibidem, p. 21. 
25 Ibidem, p. 33. 
26 Ibidem, p. 21. 
27 See, for instance: A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, ‘European Governance and the Transfer 
of ‘New’ Environmental Policy Instruments (NEPI’s) in the European Union’, 81 (3) Public Administration, 
2003, p. 555-574 and B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, ‘Old wine in new bottles? The Commission and the 
use of environmental policy instruments’, 81 (3) Public Administration, 2003, p. 575-606. 
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For the reason of more easily introducing ‘Environmental Law in Europe’ to ‘non-specialists’, the 
analysis will commence with the good governance principles of coherence and effectiveness, to be 
followed by accountability and will conclude with a combined analysis of openness and participation. 
 
3. Coherence 
The principle of coherence stresses the need for overall consistency across the boundaries of sectoral 
policies. Thus, not only can it serve the overall effectiveness of policies, but it can also make policies 
easier to understand, thus creating a baseline for civil society’s involvement. From the point of view of 
environmental law a few aspects are clearly related to this principle and addressed below. 
 
3.1 Sustainability and Coherence 
 
Article 2 EC lays down the Community task of (among other things) promoting a: ‘[…].. harmonious, 
balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, […] sustainable […] growth, […] a high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment […].’ Article 2 of the EU Treaty 
lists the objective: ‘[…] to achieve balanced and sustainable development […]’. Sustainable 
development is defined in the 5th Environmental Action Programme (EAP) as: ‘continued economic 
and social development without detriment to the environment and the natural resources on the quality 
of which continued human activity and further development depend.’28 
It is generally assumed that the introduction of the concept of sustainability (and the reference in 
Article 2 EC to ‘a high level of protection’) does make it clear that there is no (longer a) hierarchy 
between the economic and the ecological objectives of the EU/EC.29 Furthermore, sustainability 
requires a closer and more ‘positive’ relationship between environmental policies and other policy 
areas. This also follows from the integration principle of Article 6 EC. Due to this article, 
‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of 
the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development.’ The wording ‘must be’ means that the external integration of environmental 
objectives, amongst which are the requirements of Article 174 EC (see below), is achieved in other 
policy sectors.30 The integration principle does not mean that the environment has priority over other 
policy areas; it primarily serves to underline the emancipation of environmental policies. If, however, 
within another policy area an objective can be attained in a number of ways and without prejudice, 
Article 6 EC would require that the best environmental option is chosen. We must keep in mind, 
though, that the EC/EU institutions have a broad discretion when it comes to defining environmental 
policy – a discretion that will be marginally tested by the courts.31 
Several strategic EC initiatives underpin the importance of integration and sustainability.32 
Already in 1983, in the 3rd EAP, the notion of integrating environmental policy making into other policy 
areas was launched.33 Subsequently the 4th EAP, which appeared after the Single European Act, 
                                                 
28 OC(1993) C 138/1, p. 12. See also Art. 2(4) of regulation (3062/95) on Tropical Forests, (1995) OJ L 327/9, 
and, with reference to the 1987 Brundtland Report, the definition in P. Sands, Principles of International 
Environmental Law, part I, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1994, p. 198, a development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs. 
29 G. van Calster, ‘Public Environmental Law in the European Union’, in R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg 
and K. Deketelaere (eds.), Public Environmental Law in the European Union and the United States, A 
Comparative Analysis, The Hague, London, New York, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 465–515, at p. 
474. J.H. Jans, European Environmental Law, Deventer, Europa Law Publishing, 2000, p. 9.  
30 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 18. Note: ‘must be’ does not detract from the fact that Art. 174(3) EC includes 
merely as ‘taking account of’ certain aspects of environmental policy making.  
31 Ibidem, p. 21-22; G. van Calster, supra note 29, p. 477. 
32 For a summary, see: J. Scott, ‘Law and Environmental Governance in the EU’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 2002, p. 996-1005. 
33  (1983) OJ C 46/1. See also B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note27, p. 576-577.  
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strengthened the call for integrated policy making.34 The most explicit call to escape from ‘the 
environmental ghetto’ was made by the introduction of the new policy of ‘sustainability’,35 in the 5th 
EAP. Policy concerns were addressed in target sectors, such as energy, agriculture, industry and 
tourism, by a better application of the ‘polluter pays principle’ (through the internalization of external 
costs) and by promoting participation and the notion of ‘shared responsibility’.36 
In 1998 at the Cardiff summit the Council accepted the Commission’s ‘Partnership for Integration’ 
report,37 in which environmental integration was presented as a ‘chief concern’ in the EU and it was 
stipulated that the dialogue between sectoral and environmental policy makers (on all levels) should 
be facilitated. In 2001, at the Gothenburg European Council, the Commission responded to the 
Council’s request at the Helsinki summit of 1999 that a proposal should be prepared for a long-term 
strategy dovetailing policies for economically, socially and ecologically sustainable development. The 
final document, A Sustainable Europe for a better world: A European Union Strategy for sustainable 
development,38 offered a promising perspective. This was met by further support in the 6th EAP, 39 
which called for support for environmental integration ‘by effective environmental assessment of new 
policy proposals’. The Gothenburg conclusions called upon the Commission to present mechanisms to 
ensure sustainability impact assessments on all major policy proposals, covering economic, social and 
environmental consequences. Although this presentation of mechanisms was expected at the Laeken 
summit of 2001 it was not until the 2002 Barcelona summit that the Commission – merely – underlined 
the need to assess ‘the overall impact and coherence of policies (…) against overall long term 
objectives’, adding that ‘The Commission is currently developing mechanisms for assessing the 
sustainability impact.’40 Meanwhile in 2001 the Directive on strategic environmental assessment, 
relevant to strategic policy proposals, was adopted.41 
Through Article 6 EC the environmental principles of Article 174 EC (like the precautionary 
principle – see also § 5) can become interpretative guidelines for setting environmental standards both 
within and outside the environmental policy area. Together with the concept of sustainability (in Art. 2 
EC and Art. B of the EU Treaty) this should benefit the overall consistency in environmentally relevant 
decision making in the EC. It should be remembered, though, that the integration principle only binds 
the Community institutions and, strictly speaking, not the member states.42 In the course of secondary 
legislation and its implementation, however, member states will be increasingly bound by external 
integration – for instance, on the basis of the Directive on strategic environmental assessment. Work is 
currently being done to formulate further guidelines for translating the integration principle into other 
policy areas.43 
 
3.2 Coherence and IPPC 
 
When discussing integrated policy making, we should also consider the Directive on Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC).44 This Directive is primarily concerned with a more 
integrated, ‘horizontal’ approach to environmental problems. Instead of separately controlling 
emissions into the air, water and soil – thereby running the risk that pollution is transferred from one 
                                                 
34  (1987) OJ C 328/1. 
35 B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note 27, p. 577 (following D.A. Schön and M. Rein, Frame reflection. 
Toward the resolution of intractable policy controversies, New York, Basic Books, p. 4). 
36 Ibidem. 
37 COM(1998) 333 final. 
38 COM(2001) 264. See also: Presidency Conclusions, Gothenburg European Council, 15-16 June 2001, 
especially. 4-8.  
39 Further discussed below, under § 4.1. 
40 Presidency Conclusions, Barcelona European Council, 15-16 March 2002, especially 15 and furthermore 
27-39. 
41 Directive 2001/42, (2001) OJ L 197/30. 
42 See case C-379/92 Peralta 1994 [ECR] I-3453.  
43 <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/environment/index_en.htm>. 
44 See n. 5. 
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medium to the other– this Directive offers a framework for an integrated approach. The focus of 
integration lies in the granting of permits (arts. 4-9). Member states are under an obligation to ensure 
that the conditions of and the procedure for issuing a permit are fully co-ordinated if more than one 
public authority is competent (Art. 7). The authorities concerned should orientate towards an effective 
integrated approach to the proposed activity. The Directive also lays down a number of generally 
applicable substantive criteria (Art. 3). The permit itself is to include specific requirements for air, water 
and soil protection, and for pollutants that are likely to be emitted from the installation in question. The 
permit should also include emission limit values (based on the best available techniques – BAT) (Art. 
9). 
Although the introduction of general environmental law codes had already began in the member 
states before the IPPC Directive was introduced, this Directive has clearly given a new impetus to this 
trend, if only by the requirement that when issuing permits there is to be co-ordination between 
different environmental sectors. In some cases – as in Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands – 
member states have gone beyond co-ordination and have (fully) integrated permits.45 Because the 
IPPC Directive also requires BAT standards, one can expect that many general environmental law 
codes will also be(come) framework legislation, laying down competences for setting quality standards 
and emission limit values. 
 
3.3 Summing Up 
 
Amongst environmental law specialists it is a well-known statement that external integration begins 
with internal integration. For this the IPPC Directive is relevant because it obliges member states to 
integrate environmental care internally. This internal integration is increasingly matched by general 
environmental law codes in the various member states. Furthermore, in several directives, such as the 
Nitrate, the Post-Seveso II, the Wild birds and the Habitats Directives,46 one can find examples of 
linking environmental care to spatial planning, so as to ensure external integration.47 The Nitrate 
Directive, for example, requires that the member states designate vulnerable zones containing areas 
of land that drain into waters identified by the same member state as being affected by nitrate pollution 
(on the basis of community standards). For these zones action programmes are to be set up, also 
entailing mandatory measures, such as limit values. In the Post-Seveso II Directive on hazardous 
accidents, member states are obliged to ensure that town and country planning takes account of 
higher risks in areas surrounding hazardous activities. The Directives on wild birds and on habitats48 
include obligations for town and country planning to establish, for instance, special conservation 
areas. In a similar sense the Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment49 improves external 
integration. Furthermore, the Directive on strategic environmental assessment shows that the concept 
of sustainability offers a platform for external integration on the level of strategic planning or 
programming in different policy areas. Meanwhile on the member state level we find that in some 
cases, such as in Austria, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, attempts are being made to link 
plans more closely in the areas of the environment, urban planning and nature conservation.50 On a 
more general note, one can also conclude that the notion of sustainability (as included in Art. 2 EC 
and taken from the Rio Convention) is on the increase in member states’ policy statements and 
general legislation and certainly also in planning documents.51 
                                                 
45 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 573, as well as  
p. 97 and p. 103 (Denmark), p. 257 (Ireland) and p. 358 (the Netherlands). 
46 Directive 91/676, (1991) OJ L 375/1; Directive 96/82, (1997) OJ L 10/13; Directive 79/409, (1979) OJ L 
103/1 (amended); Directive 92/34, (1992) OJ L 206/7. 
47 The difficulties relating to the different procedures following from Art. 175(2) EC will be discussed in § 5.2 
(accountability; procedures). 
48 See n. 46. 
49 Directive 85/337, (1985) OJ L 175/40, with a major amendment by Directive 97/11, (1997) OJ L 73/14. 
50 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8: Austria, p. 14; Denmark, p. 102-
103; France, p. 183-184; the Netherlands, p. 355-357 and, generally, p 57. 
51 Ibidem, p. 572. 
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From the point of view of coherence, also in the sense of making environmental law more 
understandable, the question remains whether the introduction of a general environmental law code in 
a number of member states should be followed at the EC level. Such a comprehensive general 
framework directive could also give guidelines for policy co-ordination. 
More importantly, however, integration and sustainability clearly strike a chord with the notions of 
shared responsibility amongst all the social actors involved and a more bottom-up (as against top-
down) approach may be seen in the choice of instruments. Nevertheless taking the step from the 
‘declaratory level’ to the ‘operational level’52 still poses serious problems. This will be commented upon 
in the next section (especially under § 0). 
 
4. Effectiveness 
The principle of effectiveness is especially interesting with regard to the introduction of new 
environmental instruments, signifying a turn towards a market-based approach embedded in the 
notion of shared responsibility between government and civil society. For the purpose of discovering 
whether such a shift away from ‘command and control’ legislation has taken or is taking place, a 
number of relevant aspects have been selected. 
 
4.1 Strategic EC Environmental Policy Perspective 
According to Article 175, paragraph 3 EC the Community is to adopt general action programmes, 
setting priority objectives, on the basis of which the Council is to take the necessary initiatives (by 
introducing measures) whereby these objectives can be attained. Earlier, in § 3.1 of this contribution, 
some of these EAPs were already mentioned. Even before Article 175 EC was introduced the 
Community had adopted its first EAPs, setting priorities for a time scale of 4 to 5 years. Plans were 
presented in 1973, 1977, 1983, 1987 and 1993.53 Each of these plans had its own focus. The first two 
EAPs were mainly concerned with setting the objectives and principles and pointing out the most 
essential remedial actions. The third EAP was primarily concerned with the preventive approach and 
integrating the environment in a socio-economic context. Promoting a high level of protection by the 
use of strict environmental standards was the main element in the fourth EAP.  
For this contribution the Fifth EAP is especially interesting, as it was the first EAP with a truly 
strategic content. Its title, ‘Towards Sustainability’, indicated that environmental policies were to entail 
a change in patterns of behaviour in society as a whole, especially through the much stronger 
involvement of all social actors. The aforementioned notion of ‘shared responsibility’ is presented as a 
prerequisite for sustainable development and is understood to entail ‘partnerships’ with and 
participation of social and economic actors in setting and implementing environmental policies, 
through applying a much broader range of instruments: more bottom-up (as in self-regulation, by 
labelling and auditing), more market-based (e.g. taxes and fiscal measures) and more ‘horizontal’ or 
‘suasive’ actions (support by means of public information and education). 
In 1998 a review of this Fifth EAP was presented,54 stressing, amongst other things, the need for: 
1) a more consistent approach to the integration principle; 2) the use of a broader range of 
instruments; 3) investing in better communication, diffusion of information, training and education so 
as to increase awareness concerning the need for greater sustainability and to promote the required 
behavioural changes. 
                                                 
52 B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note 27, p. 575. 
53 (1973) OJ C 112/1; (1977) OJ C 139/1; (1983) OJ C 46/1; (1987) OJ C 328/1 and (1993) OJ C 138/1. 
54 Decision 2179/98, (1998) OJ L 275/1 
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Finally, in 2002, the sixth EAP, ‘Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice’, was launched.55 To 
achieve improvements in priority areas, such as climate change and nature and biodiversity, five 
approaches are set out. According to this EAP, these approaches: 
‘emphasize the need for more effective implementation and more innovative solutions. The 
Commission recognizes that a wider constituency must be addressed, including businesses that can 
only gain from a successful environmental policy. The Programme seeks new and innovative 
instruments for meeting complex environmental challenges. Legislation is not abandoned, but a more 
effective use of legislation is sought together with a more participatory approach to policy making. The 
five key approaches are to: 1) Ensure the implementation of existing environmental legislation; 2) 
Integrate environmental concerns into all relevant policy areas (applying the Integration principle – 
MAH); 3) Work closely with business and consumers to identify solutions; 4) Ensure better and more 
accessible information on the environment for citizens; 5) Develop a more environmentally conscious 
attitude towards land use. The new Programme provides the environmental component of the 
Community’s forthcoming strategy for sustainable development. It continues to pursue some of the 
targets from the Fifth Environment Action Programme, which came to an end in 2000. But the new 
Sixth Environment Action Programme (…) goes further, adopting a more strategic approach. It calls for 
the active involvement and accountability of all sections of society in the search for innovative, 
workable and sustainable solutions to the environmental problems we face’.56 
It is worth noticing, explicitly in the above quote, that ‘legislation is not abandoned’ and that the 
implementation of existing environmental legislation must be ensured. Perhaps the 6th EAP is an 
attempt to promote new instruments based on the view that conventional instruments should be 
retained. Or, in other words, a proposal aimed at a ‘flexible response’ to existing and forthcoming 
environmental problems, which will more frequently lead to the use of a mix of instruments in order to 
tackle one and the same environmental problem. Furthermore, the 6th EAP is the first EAP to be 
adopted under the co-decision procedure (as agreed upon in the Maastricht Treaty) and can be 
considered to have an even greater legal significance; maybe it is even legally binding, as Rittberger 
and Richardson proclaim.57 Certainly this could add some weight to the question of whether the 
present EAP is yet another instance in a series of merely ‘declaratory’ strategy documents or whether 
it presents a document that by virtue of its legal stature requires that its (key) elements and proposals 
are made operational.  
In the following we will look at this operational level, along the lines of the institutional framework 
for introducing new environmental instruments. Firstly, we will look at a leading EC principle, that of 
proportionality, and, secondly, the interplay between the EC and its member states, mainly with a view 
to the implementation of EC legislation. In conclusion a few examples of the attempts to introduce new 
environmental instruments will be presented. 
 
4.2 Proportionality 
 
According to the guidelines included in the Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam on the interpretation of 
the principle of proportionality, listed under Article 5 EC (‘Any action by the Community shall not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this treaty.’),58 the Community should aim for 
measures that respect national legal provisions to the greatest extent and (that) leave the highest 
degree of discretion to the member states. Directives are preferred above regulations and framework 
directives are preferred above detailed legislation. The use of minimum standards (such as for 
emissions) is generally preferred, because it leaves room for member states to decide whether or not 
                                                 
55 Decision of 22.07.2002, (1998) OJ L242. 
56 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/newprg/index.htm DD 24/02/2003>.  
57 B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note 27, p. 582. 
58 Considered to be of great importance to the principles of good governance: White Paper,  
p. 10-11. 
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to apply stricter standards. Furthermore, non-binding measures, such as recommendations and 
voluntary codes of conduct, should be used where possible.59 
Clearly in environmental law the Directive is the main operational regulatory device, with an 
increasing preference for using minimum standards. Framework directives are now in operation in the 
areas of water,60 air61 and waste.62 They allow for further regulations through ‘daughter directives’ in 
which we find emission limit values and/or quality standards or objectives (possibly linked to a 
standstill requirement).63 Establishing these daughter directives can be mandatory on the basis of a list 
of substances or other pollutants or of products or other recipients which are susceptible to 
environmental harm.64 Further regulation on the member state level is accommodated by explicitly 
allowing competence to maintain or introduce more stringent standards.65 
Minimum harmonization, even when it is exhaustive, leaves room for member states to introduce 
more stringent standards and is therefore more readily used where the internal market is less affected, 
as in the case of (minimum standards for) the quality of water and air, as well as for flora and fauna.66 
A directive that offers minimum rather than total harmonization67 is often recognized by the so-called 
‘minimum harmonization clause’. This clause, however, is increasingly less used as member states 
can always have recourse to Article 176 EC and unilaterally introduce or maintain more stringent 
protective measures (if they are otherwise compatible with the Treaty) – although this matter is still 
subject to some debate.68 
Often, regulatory discretion is given to member states on the basis of their obligation to adopt 
environmental (implementation) plans and programmes (possibly linked to certain priority pollutants or 
other types of priorities), setting out specific policy lines and further measures – as in the framework 
directives on waste (Art. 7), water (Art. 11) and air pollution.69 Meanwhile, plans and programmes also 
appear outside framework directives, as in the Habitats Directive (the so-called management plans for 
special conservation areas in Art. 6). These instruments also include room for participation either by 
the general public or interested parties, which also strengthens the communicative element in 
environmental policy making. 
 
4.3 Interplay and Implementation 
 
In their analysis of new environmental policy instruments (nepis), Jordan et al. refer to five role models 
for European interplay, which are particularly relevant to policy transfer, especially transfer to ‘nepis’.70 
Within the role model of the passive arena (1) innovation takes place without the involvement of EC-
institutions, but simply by the diffusion of information and knowledge between member states with 
similar environmental problems and similar environmental law systems. The emulation of the German 
                                                 
59 See Council resolution on the drafting, implementation and enforcement of Community environmental law, 
(1997) OJ C 321/1. 
60 See Directive 2000/60, (2000) OJ L 327/1.  
61 Directive 96/62 on ambient air quality assessment and management, (1996) OJ L 296/55. 
62 Directive 91/156, (1991) OJ L 78/32. 
63 Primarily saying that if the factual quality is better than what the directive requires, the factual quality 
becomes the standard (see for instance Art. 11, § 6 of the Water framework directive).  
64 See Art. 4 of the ‘Air framework directive’. 
65 See arts. 10(3) and 11(4) of the ‘Water framework directive’, and also Case C-138/98, Fornasar, in relation 
to Art. 18 of the ‘Waste framework directive’. Furthermore, the ‘Waste framework-directive’ offers general 
rules on (categories of) waste but goes on (see arts. 3-5) to require member states to introduce (additional) 
measures on prevention, reduction and recovery of waste (and, although not strictly within a framework 
directive, Art. 14 of the Wild birds directive). 
66 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 112. 
67 This is a type of harmonization that is only used if there is a strong link with the free movement of goods, so 
especially when product standards are involved (as with the amount of exhaust fumes and the amount of 
noise produced by cars). 
68 See J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 118. 
69 Art. 7(3) of the ‘Air framework directive’, for instance, stipulates that member states are to take the 
necessary steps to ensure compliance with limit values and also to establish action plans to abate the risks 
of exceeding thresholds. 
70 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 556-558. 
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Eco-labelling system is mentioned as a typical example of this type of transfer. In the facilitating arena 
(2) we find a transfer between member states and between member states and the EC institutions, but 
now the diffusion is enhanced by the EC as a network of policy actors and processes. The sharing of 
ideas through the EC channels, such as when Dutch officials showcased their environmental planning 
views in the wake of the 5th EAP, is an important driving-force for innovation. In the harmonization 
arena (3) the objective of a Single European market (SEM) is the determining factor behind innovative 
policy transfer. The effects of member states’ regulations on the SEM, as in the case of the German 
Packaging Waste Ordinance, can be an important motive to introduce new and Communitarian 
instruments and thus avoid (further) distortions. EC regulation represents a governance structure as a 
competitive arena (4) in which member states ‘compete for economic advantage and try to limit their 
regulatory adjustments costs’. Member states may want to remain ahead of EC regulation and 
influence both the EC environmental agenda and other member states in favour of adopting legislation 
which is similar to their own. The EMAS Directive (discussed below) offers the example of Great 
Britain and other member states promoting the adaptation of the ‘British scheme’ that was already in 
place in their jurisdictions. Finally, then, in the role model of the independent actor (5) we find the EC 
institutions, mainly the Commission, that adopt an entrepreneurial attitude in employing new initiatives 
either through the official decision-making procedures, as in emissions trading and energy taxation, or 
entering into voluntary agreements, as is the case with industry concerning fuel economy. 
It is particularly interesting to focus on the harmonization arena and to ask what room is left within 
that context for member states that whish to use new policy instruments as a means of implementing 
EC legislation. Considering the approach suggested in the previous section (§ Error! Reference 
source not found.), directives, especially framework directives, can explicitly provide room for 
member states’ regulatory initiatives. 
Within the boundaries of implementing EC environmental law, however, the option of co- or even 
self-regulation seems to be excluded by the requirements of Article 249 EC. In other words, the type of 
‘horizontal’ legislation that the White Paper proposes is not an option for member states, unless either 
the EC so obliges, or a member state has recourse to Article 176 EC.  
A first possibility would have been to implement a directive by referring to technical standards 
that are being produced by or in conjunction with the industry itself – like the ISO and CEN standards. 
Thus the ‘target groups’ themselves could be more strongly committed to the regulatory process. The 
problem here is that these types of technical standards are not in themselves binding and often are 
proposed merely as guidelines for ‘good environmental practice’; so it is up to whoever so wishes to 
apply them. From the case law of the Court of Justice we may conclude that this mode of 
implementation is only acceptable if the use of these standards is explicitly prescribed in legislation 
that is binding, because only then can citizens exert their rights.71  
Similarly the idea of implementation by environmental agreements would more closely involve 
major stakeholders. However, these types of agreements are arrived at voluntarily, between certain 
parties (most often administrative branches of government and sectors of industry), entailing that 
certain objectives should be met (or more often – only – aspired for) in relation to a certain activity, 
product or substance. These characteristics do not (sufficiently) match the transposition requirements 
of being legally binding (also on third parties) and of full implementation (derived from Art. 249 EC). 
Only if such an agreement would be referred to in binding legislation as being generally binding, could 
one imagine that this mode of transposition would be acceptable.72 Again, if the directive itself were to 
propagate this method of implementation it would be legally acceptable.73  
Meanwhile in 1996 the Commission issued a recommendation concerning environmental 
agreements implementing Community directives – which was matched in 1997 by a Council 
                                                 
71 See for instance Case 361/88, 1991, I-2567 and C-59/89, 1991, I-2607 (TA-Luft). J.H. Jans, supra note 29, 
p. 144-145. 
72 Case 215/83, 1985 1055; J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 146-147. 
73 Directive 93/76 (1993) OJ L 237/28. To limit carbon dioxide emissions by improving energy efficiency 
(SAVE), Art. 1: ‘Programmes can include laws, regulations, economic and administrative instruments, 
information, education and voluntary agreements whose impact can be objectively assessed.’ See also 
Case C-255/93 I-4949.  
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Resolution on the same subject.74 The bottom line is that both institutions wish to promote the use of 
these agreements and, to match that aspiration, have laid down guidelines for the implementation of 
Community environmental directives by agreement. These guidelines consist of two sets of rules, one 
set of rules that should be complied with in all cases and one set of rules that should be complied with 
if appropriate. In the first – compulsory – list we find provisions on the enforcement, clarity and 
timeliness of objectives, publication, monitoring and reporting (to authorities and the general public), 
as well as openness (of the agreement to other possible parties). In the second list – on 
‘appropriateness’ – we find clauses on ascertaining whether the aspired results are being reached, on 
the access of third parties to (in-company) information on the implementation of the agreement, and 
finally on sanctions.  
Together with Jans we may conclude that if these requirements are met, there is indeed little 
difference between transposition through environmental agreements or through legally binding 
(unilateral) legislation. In his view, Article 249 EC leaves little room for a more lenient approach to this 
matter – although, so far, we have no case law on the application of these guidelines.75 
Meanwhile, jumping ahead to the independent actor profile, we find that the Commission itself 
has also taken up initiatives on voluntary agreements at the Community level. In this it has ‘rallied’ 
support in the 5th EAP and in some of the member states’ criticism of the EC’s interventionalist 
instruments.76 By late 2001, however, only some 12 voluntary agreements had been adopted, such as 
on fuel economy with European and – later – with Japanese and Korean car manufacturers. 
Questions have been raised as to aspects of legitimacy, legality and transparency; especially 
considering that the Council and the European Parliament are kept outside the negotiations and that 
there is no specific legal basis for entering into these types of agreements in the EC Treaty. From the 
Commission’s standpoint however, voluntary agreements offer an interesting means to pursue its own 
objectives beyond the reach of (increased) parliamentary powers.77 Recently, however, the 
Commission has issued a Communication containing a new framework proposal on Community-level 
voluntary agreements as a means of co-regulation and self-regulatory arrangement within legislative 
targets set by the EC.78 
Finally, returning to the member states’ level, the harmonization arena has taken its toll on some 
voluntary agreements by simply replacing them by EC legislation. Examples are the End-of-life 
Vehicles Directive (effectively rendering Austrian and German schemes void)79 and the Packaging and 
Packaging Waste Directive (replacing an existing voluntary agreement in the Netherlands – although 
the directive itself has again been implemented through voluntary agreements!).80 
 
4.4 Exemplars 
 
Meanwhile, against the backdrop of these limitations, we do indeed witness the introduction of less 
top-down regulations. A few examples are listed below.81 
The EC regulations on Eco-labelling82 and Eco-management and auditing (EMAS)83 present a 
communicative type of regulation, in which, although these schemes are moulded in a directly binding 
format, participation takes place on a voluntary basis.  
                                                 
74 Commission recommendation 96/733 (1996), OJ L 333/69 and Council Resolution of 7 October 1997, 
(1997) OJ C 321/6. The Commission also mentions European-wide agreements but is sceptic on that issue. 
75 J.H. Jans supra note 29, p. 148; Jans proposes even further requirements. 
76 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 566. 
77 Ibidem. 
78 Environmental agreements at the Community level within the framework of the action plan on the 
simplification and improvement of the regulatory environment, COM(2002) 412 final. 
79 Directive 2000/53, (2000) OJ L 269/34. 
80 Directive 94/62, (1994) OJ L 365/10. 
81 As voluntary agreements have already been discussed in above, they are not included within these 
examples. 
82 Regulation 880/1992, (1992) OJ L 099 (amended). 
83 Regulation 761/2001, (2001) OJ L 114/1. 
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The Eco-label award Regulation is based on the German example. The Commission, in an 
entrepreneurial role, deemed it necessary to protect the SEM against a proliferation of similar 
schemes.84 The regulation is aimed at promoting, for consumers, the option of purchasing products 
which are less harmful to the environment. By labelling, the consumer has more insight concerning the 
environmental benefits of that product. The label is attached to a product only if the environmental 
impact of a product is reduced in the course of its entire life cycle. A company can apply for the award 
of an eco-label to one (or more) of its products (arts. 6-7) – again, this is a completely voluntary 
decision. Each member state has a national authority which is competent to judge whether or not a 
label can be awarded (arts. 7 and 14). In deciding this authority is to apply the guidelines contained in 
the Regulation.85 Awarding an eco-label entails that this authority enters into an agreement with the 
applicant on matters concerning the use of the label (Art. 9).86 For the eco-label scheme to become 
successful stakeholder support will be essential. The revision of the scheme in 200087 seems to have 
led to a somewhat greater acceptance (since 2001 the number of applications has risen by 150 
percent).88 
The EMAS regulation is concerned with the voluntary participation of industrial companies in an 
eco-management and audit scheme, designed to monitor and improve the environmental performance 
of a company and to offer information on the performance to the general public (Art. 1). A company’s 
application will only be granted when it adopts an environmental eco-management system that 
incorporates (continuously updated) standards included in or set on the basis of the regulation (Art. 3). 
If all the criteria are voluntarily met, a competent national authority will register the company. Being 
registered (arts. 6-8) can be advantageous to companies mainly by virtue of a more favourable public 
image.  
Similarly, features of less top-down regulation can be found in sectoral (or vertical) legislation. In 
stimulating the use of agreements and economic incentives the Nitrate Directive,89 for instance, 
requires member states to establish a ‘code of good agricultural practice’ which can serve as a basis 
for entering into (voluntary) agreements with farmers. Directive 70/220 on air pollution caused by 
vehicles90 offers an interesting possibility of financial incentives for buying clean cars. Furthermore, 
Directive 99/94 on consumer information on fuel economy and CO2 emissions sets out to improve 
information to the public on car performances.91 
A somewhat different innovative strand of regulations has been introduced in the field of tradable 
allowances.92 Regulation 2037/2000 on substances that deplete the ozone layer,93 implementing the 
Vienna Convention and Montreal protocol,94 contains a system of trade through licences to import or 
export controlled substances from other countries (which may or may not be parties to the Montreal 
protocol). More important, and certainly more innovative, is the Directive establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community.95 This scheme precedes the 
obligations under the first commitment period of the Kyoto protocol (2008-2012) and aims to prepare 
the Community for allowances trading. The possibility of allowances trading has two important 
advantages: 1) emission reduction will take place where it is most cost-efficient to do so. This in itself 
does not reduce the total emissions, but it does improve collective efficiency, to the benefit of all the 
permit holders; 2) the use of a trading system will minimize distortions in competition. Furthermore, 
                                                 
84 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 569. 
85 In part delegated to the Commission.  
86 The Commission has issued a standard agreement: Decision 2000/729, (2000) OJ L 293/20. 
87 Regulation 1980/2000, (2000) OJ L 237. 
88 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 570. 
89 Especially Art. 4 of Directive 91/676, (1991) OJ L 375/1. 
90 (1970) OJ l76/1, amended by Directive 94/12, (1994) OJ L100. 
91 (2000) OJ L12/16. 
92 See J. Scott, supra note 32 and E. Woerdman, Implementing the Kyoto Mechanisms: Political Barriers and 
Path Dependence, Ph.D. thesis at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands), Groningen, University 
Library Groningen, 2002. 
93 (2000) OJ L 244/1. 
94 (1988) OJ L 297/10 (Vienna Convention) and (1988) OJ L 299/21 (Montreal Protocol). 
95 Directive 2003/87 (2003) OJ L 275. 
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one may argue that trading systems will be a stimulus to developing less pollutant production 
techniques.96 
To these examples we can add the carbon-energy tax. The Commission took up the initiative to 
introduce such a tax scheme in response to the studies on and the use of environmental taxes in 
member states such as Denmark and the Netherlands and also because of fears, from other member 
states, of (distortions in the SEM and) competitive impacts caused by national tax schemes.97 
Although there was a positive momentum for an EC initiative, member states’ sovereign(ty) interests in 
conjunction with the unanimity requirement within the Council, made it very difficult to arrive at an 
agreement. A 1997 proposal proved unconvincing, but finally, in 2003, a framework directive was 
adopted.98 
Clearly, instruments of indirect and self-regulation are taken up at the member state level.99 In 
many countries we can find examples of new instruments, such as taxation,100 subsidies,101 tradable 
emission rights,102 gentlemen’s agreements103 and schemes for labelling, audits and management.104 
Regardless of these examples, the previous enthusiasm over these types of arrangements has 
somewhat died down. Maybe initially the expectations were too optimistic. As was said concerning the 
6th EAP, at this point in time the idea of completely moving away from direct regulation and replacing 
the top-down model by strictly horizontal instruments is no longer considered viable or desirable. A 
more eclectic approach has seen the light of day, in which with each problem an optimal mix of 
instruments is sought.105 
 
4.5 Summing Up 
 
The objectives of sustainability and a high level of protection (Art. B EU Treaty, arts. 2 and 174(1) EC 
Treaty) are ambitious yet operationally underdetermined. Much is to be gained but very little is 
ensured. What can effectively be achieved lies in the wake of the willingness of all concerned to 
consider environmental policy making as a joint venture. An important question is how the 
effectiveness of environmental legal policies can be improved in the context of the EC framework. How 
much room can and indeed should be given to the implementation of EC legislation by private 
guidelines, environmental agreements and environmental management systems? Or, for that matter, 
what room should be left for autonomous legislation by member states?  
Given the focus of this contribution, the principle of effectiveness is especially relevant to the 
attempts to make more use of horizontal instruments (instead of top-down or vertical ones). On that 
note clearly the IPPC Directive (discussed under § Error! Reference source not found.) offers 
something of a disappointment. The main instruments in this Directive are permits and general 
emission standards. Although the Directive is geared towards creating more integration, it 
                                                 
96 See also J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 1002. 
97 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 565-566. 
98 Directive 2003/96, (2003) OJ L 283/51. 
99 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 570. 
100 See ECO, Product, Fuel and Green taxes in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands; 
R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 17,  
p. 109, p. 219, p. 293 and p. 367.  
101 See the income tax system in Flanders (Belgium) and the German subsidies (in connection with agreements 
on reduction-targets); R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 54-55 
and p. 220. 
102 These are difficult to find on a member state level. There certainly are (or have been) discussions on this 
matter, but no implementation – apart from tradable rights in the agricultural area.  
103 Like in Flanders (on waste policy), in Denmark (with a general legal basis in the Environmental Protection 
Act!) and in Germany (both on a private and public law basis), R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. 
Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 52, 108 and 222.  
104 For instance in Flanders, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Spain; R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. 
Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 52-53, p. 103, p. 260-261, p. 293 and  
p. 428. 
105 See also B. Rittberger and J. Richarson, supra note 27, p. 603. 
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nevertheless does not satisfy the promises included in the preceding 5th EAP Programme. Possibly 
the more ‘balanced approach’ of the 6th EAP found its predecessor in the IPPC Directive.  
Having said this, we find that there are also many regulatory initiatives that do seem to fit with the 
EAP’s call for ‘partnerships’. The aforementioned EMAS and Eco-labelling regulations clearly signify 
this. Furthermore, we have seen that the concepts of framework directives (such as for water, air and 
waste), (interactive) planning and programming, using minimum instead of total harmonization, are 
clearly present. When we look at the initiatives on the member state level, we also find that there are 
many examples of regulatory initiatives within the realm of indirect and self-regulation, especially 
taxation, subsidies, environmental agreements (sometimes even on a statutory basis), environmental 
management schemes and voluntary codes of conduct (good practice). 
 
5. Accountability 
Taking responsibility and explaining actions are the key elements of the principle of accountability. In 
the context of Environmental Law comments will be limited to two issues, mainly in view of what is still 
to be discussed under § 6 on openness and participation. The first issue to be commented upon 
(under § 5.1) is environmental principles, taking the viewpoint that it takes a substantive ‘benchmark’ 
before transgressors can be truly held to be accountable. The second issue for comment (under § 5.2) 
is internal EC decision-making procedures in environmental law. 
5.1 Principles 
 
The second paragraph of Article 174 EC presents a number of principles of European environmental 
policy: 1) a high level of protection; 2) the precautionary principle; 3) the prevention principle; 4) the 
source principle; 5) the polluter pays principle; 6) the safeguard clause. One could well argue that 
these principles offer standards for accountability, but one should be aware of two important aspects. 
First of all, these principles meet a general characteristic of principles in that they are intrinsically 
vague. This means that it takes case law and, possibly, further guidelines to determine their more 
precise content and to be able to truly apply them as benchmarks. Secondly, the question remains 
whether and, if so, to what extent courts are willing to use these principles as legal criteria. As such we 
should distinguish between direct use, such as rules of conduct, and indirect use, such as guidelines 
for the interpretation of other substantive or procedural regulations (take, for instance, the relationship 
between the burden of proof and the precautionary principle). When applied directly we should 
consider that when discretionary competences lie at the heart of the legal dispute, this may give rise to 
a more marginal test as to whether certain principles have been adhered to. 
The principles of ‘a high level of protection’, ‘precaution’ and ‘prevention’, offer interesting 
examples of the above.  
The principle of attaining a high level of protection is typically a principle that entails so much 
discretion that it is questionable whether it could indeed be considered a legal principle – or rather a 
political objective. Apart from the fact that the section includes the words ‘seek to achieve a high 
level…’, a ‘high level of protection’ is not to say ‘the highest level of protection’; there is still room for 
weighing interests, amongst which are possibly the diversity of situations in the various regions of the 
Community. Amongst the institutions of the EC, however, the principle offers an argumentative basis 
in the political debate.106 
Secondly, the precautionary principle is relevant as it requires proper account to be taken of 
available scientific and technical data (as required by Art. 174, § 3 EC) and it also determines that 
even indicative or tentative scientific data may suffice as a basis for taking protective measures.107 
Absolute scientific certainty (even if it were to exist) is not a prerequisite for introducing restrictive 
measures: ‘in dubio pro natura’. The precautionary principle also applies to the IPPC Directive in 
                                                 
106 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 32. 
107 See J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 33-34. 
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determining the ‘best available techniques’, when considering the possible risks involved.108 We also 
find the precautionary principle being applied in examples of secondary legislation, especially in aiding 
the interpretation of relevant provisions.109 
Thirdly, the prevention principle was an important subject in the 3rd EAP.110 It was stressed in this 
programme that the improvement of information and knowledge, as well as the diffusion thereof 
amongst decision-makers, interested parties and the public as a whole(!) is of the utmost importance. 
All relevant information should be considered in the earliest possible stage in the decision-making 
process. The Directive on the freedom of access to information on the environment,111 which will be 
discussed below, is an important outcome of this line of reasoning. The same can be said of the 
Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA – also to be discussed below).112 The preventive 
principle contributed to the understanding that, alongside to direct measures to further the 
environmental cause, Article 174 EC also underpins indirect measures, such as freedom of access to 
information, the shaping of the environmental decision-making process (as in the EIA and IPPC 
Directives), and EMAS and Eco-labelling regulations. As I will go on to show below (in § 6) this 
acknowledgement is an important step towards good environmental governance.  
It should be well understood that the environmental principles are only directly binding on EC 
institutions and that these often involve considerable discretion.113 Again, though, the courts may use 
these principles as guidelines in interpreting secondary EC legislation and, sometimes, in judging 
specific member states’ autonomous measures.114 
Especially in member states with General Environmental Law Codes (such as in Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands), or drafts to that end (such as in Germany and Italy), we find 
environmental principles being codified (or proposals to do so). In Spain a reference to such principles 
is even included in the Constitution, with an explicit link to the principles of Article 174 EC. In most 
cases there is a strong similarity between the EC principles and the ‘state principles’. Generally 
speaking, these state principles are considered to be mere guidelines for policy making, rather than 
legal principles of a kind similar to principles of natural justice. It is expected, though, that these 
principles will have an indirect legal effect such, as for instance, through the process of interpreting 
existing regulations.115 
Whether or not environmental principles should or should not extend to a right to a clean or 
healthy environment is a matter taken up in § 7. 
 
5.2 Procedures 
 
From a legal point of view procedures represent the fabric of the competences and responsibilities of 
the institutions involved. Let us then turn to these procedures first. In the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) it 
was decided that decisions under the Title (then VII) on the Environment116 could be taken by a 
qualified majority. An exception – still – applies to a number of specific policy areas as mentioned 
under the second paragraph of Article 175 EC, amongst which are fiscal provisions, town and country 
planning measures and the management of water resources, as well as measures affecting the 
member state’s choice between energy sources. In those cases the Council can only decide 
                                                 
108 See Annex IV of Directive 96/61, (1996) OJ L 257/26. 
109 For instance, case C-180/96, United Kingdom v. Commission [1998] ECR I-2265.  
110 (1983) OJ C 46/1. 
111 Directive 90/313, (1990) OJ L 158/56. 
112 Directive 85/337, (1985) OJ L 175/40 (amended). 
113 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 21-22; G. van Calster, supra note 29, p. 477. 
114 On the binding effect for member states, see G. Winter, ‘Environmental Principles and Community Law’, in 
J.H. Jans (ed.), The European Convention and the Future of European Environmental Law, Proceedings of 
the Avosetta Group of European Environmental Lawyers, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2003, p. 3-25. 
Compare as an example also the Walloon Waste case, Case C-2/90 Commission v. Belgium [1992] ECR I-
4431. 
115 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 567-568. 
116 At that moment Art. 130R-T EC. 
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unanimously, unless it is unanimously decided by the Council that on a certain matter within the scope 
of these exempted areas a decision will be taken with a qualified majority.  
Given the close relationship between environmental protection and improvement, on the one 
hand, and town and country planning, on the other, this can be considered as a barrier to integrated 
and comprehensive policy making.117 Apart from the question whether the Community has the power 
to pursue a solitary town and country planning policy, it will be clear that in many cases environmental 
policies will have a certain effect in this type of planning, such as in protecting flora and fauna, or in the 
use of zoning for reasons of air pollution or the hazard of major accidents.118 This also applies to 
environmental impact assessment, where some decisions for which an assessment is to be made 
concern town or country planning.119 In practice, however, in the latter two cases the majority-rule 
procedure was indeed applied.120 As for introducing environmental taxes, as stated under § 4.4, the 
unanimity rule and sovereign(ty) considerations clearly pose an obstacle for the introduction of new, 
economic environmental instruments of this type. 
In the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam it was decided that (almost) all of the EC environmental 
legislation is to be prepared in accordance with the co-decision procedure (of Art. 251 EC), thus 
ensuring a veto for the European Parliament (EP).121 This procedure also applies to the setting of 
EAPs, as Article 175(3) EC stipulates. We have to consider that co-decision does not necessarily lead 
to more stringent environmental policies, but it will certainly strengthen the legitimacy of these policies. 
The position of the EP will strengthen and with that the parliament will also be held more accountable 
by civil society. According to some, the applicability of Article 175(3) EC on adopting EAPs makes 
these (future) EAPs legally binding.122 
On the issue of accountability, however, we should be well aware that many environmental 
standards are set in what is called the ‘comitology procedure’. This applies especially to technical 
standards for which the regulatory procedure is ‘delegated’. The legal basis for this practice can be 
found in Article 202, third indent EC Treaty. The Council has imposed certain requirements in the 
exercise of this competence. It has done so in a separate Comitology Decision,123 laying out the basic 
rules and principles for this procedure (or in fact procedures – as there are four types). The Council 
can set more specific requirements in the specific case where powers to implement are conferred on 
the Commission.124 Presently the general rules on decision making in the Comitology procedure(s) are 
under revision.125 The comitology procedure is ‘activated’ through a clause in a specific directive. On 
the basis of that clause a representative of the Commission submits a draft proposal on certain 
technical standards to a committee. The committee subsequently offers an opinion. If the final 
proposal is in accordance with the committee’s opinion then the Commission can adopt the standards; 
if there is discrepancy the Commission sends the proposal to the Council which can take a final 
decision on the basis of majority voting, within a certain time-limit (if this limit is exceeded the 
Commission decides). An example of this comitology procedure can be found in the framework 
directive on waste.126 
 
                                                 
117 As dealt with under Coherence; § Error! Reference source not found.. 
118 Seveso-II Directive 96/82, (1997) OJ L 10/13. 
119 See annex II (under 10) to directive 85/337 as amended by Directive 97/11, (1997) OJ L 073/5. Also (Art. 3 
under 2a of) Directive 01/42, (2001) OJ L 197/30. 
120 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 46-47. 
121 G. van Calster, supra note 29, p. 9; J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 9. 
122 See the considerations under § 4.1. 
123 Second Comitology Decision 1999/468, (1999) OJ L 184/23 (repealing the First Comitology Decision 
1987/373, (1987) OJ L 197.  
124 See also Case C-378/00 Commission v. Council and EP. 
125 See, amongst other sources: Report from the Commission, on the working of committees in 2002, 
COM(2003) 530 final. See also J.H. Jans, ‘EU Environmental Policy and the Civil Society’, in J.H. Jans 
(ed.), The European Convention and the Future of European Environmental Law, Proceedings of the 
Avosetta Group of European Environmental Lawyers, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2003, p. 55-66, 
especially p. 61-62. 
126 See Art. 1(a) and Art. 18 of Directive 91/156, (1991) OJ L 78/32 (amendment of 75/442, (1975) OJ L 
194/47).  
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5.3 Summing Up 
 
Environmental principles can be regarded as ‘benchmarks’ for accountability in environmental policy 
making. Mainly through the role of the Courts, even though the legal test will often be a marginal one, 
this type of benchmarking will play an increasingly more important role. Gradually, environmental 
principles are also being introduced on the member state level, by and large consistent with EC 
principles. It still remains to be seen whether these ‘stately principles’ will become relevant to legal 
accountability, but the first step seems to have been taken. 
Voting by qualified majority and applying the co-decision procedure are important tools for 
increased accountability – especially in view of the role of the EP.127 Accountability can, however, be 
in question when ‘comitology’ creeps in. In part this will be unavoidable (especially with technical 
standards for products), but it does increase the possibility of bureaucratic policy making (and shutting 
out civil society). The alternative of leaving further regulation to lower public authorities or to voluntary 
schemes should be taken firmly into consideration. One should also consider that in leaving (more) 
room for member states to maintain and introduce more stringent measures and to apply instruments 
of a more ‘horizontal and co-regulatory’ nature their involvement can be strengthened and thus their 
accountability (in the sense of legitimacy). This would also match the fact that the 6th EAP clearly 
stipulates that accountability is a principle which is relevant to all sections of the Community, that is to 
say, both on a supranational and on the member state level. Accountability also implies taking 
responsibility – making use of the possibilities to enter into more horizontal forms of regulation.  
 
6. Openness and Participation 
 
As stated above, in the light of the prevention principle (under 5a), the objectives as listed in the first 
paragraph of Article 174 EC not only allow for direct measures to further the environmental cause, but 
also for indirect measures such as the freedom of access to information,128 the shaping of the 
environmental decision making-process, as in the case of the EIA and IPPC Directives,129 as well as in 
the case of the regulation on Eco-audits and on EEA.130  
Both in the area of openness and participation, clearly the importance of ensuring proper decision 
making (especially concerning fact-finding and assessment) as well as the general availability of 
environmental information, and also public participation throughout the policy chain, has been 
recognized as a major legal cornerstone of environmental law in Europe. Not only as a means to 
further the legitimacy of vertical legislation (by ensuring better involvement),131 but also as a means of 
making citizens and civil institutions more sensitive to environmental processes. Thus the 
internalization of environmental effects in behavioural patterns has a better opportunity, especially as 
the diffusion of information is supported by the new types of environmental instruments (as discussed 
above).132 The Arhus Convention133 is an important UN document, to which the EC is a signatory that 
underpins three basic legal requirements in the area of openness and participation: a) access to 
environmental information; b) public participation; c) access to judicial review in environmental cases. 
Each of these requirements, also referred to as the three ‘Arhus pillars’, has given rise to legislation or 
proposals thereon. The main examples of these are listed below. 
 
                                                 
127 To say that this will enhance the legitimacy of the outcome is still somewhat optimistic in my view, but this 
procedure is far preferable to other existing ones. 
128 Supra, n. 3. 
129 Supra, n. 4 and n. 5. 
130 (1993) OJ L 168/1 and (1990) OJ L 120/1. 
131 J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 999. 
132 See also D.J. Fiorino, ‘Rethinking environmental regulation: perspectives on law and governance’, 23 
Harvard Environmental Law Review, 1999, p. 441-469, especially p. 465-466. 
133 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, signed by the EC on the 25th of June 1998; COM(1998) 344 final. 
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6.1 Impact Assessment 
 
Historically, one of the first initiatives to further access to environmental information is the Directive on 
Environmental Impact Assessment. The first EIA Directive was implemented in 1985 and since then 
several amendments have followed.134 The EIA Directive requires the member states to introduce a 
procedure in their national legal system so that projects that are likely to have a significant effect on 
the environment are subjected to an assessment of these effects before consent is given for the 
project. The impact assessment is to include at least the following: a description of the project and of 
measures envisaged to avoid, reduce and remedy environmental effects; data required to identify and 
assess the main effects; an outline of the main alternatives to the project and a non-technical 
summary for the public. Openness and participation are cornerstones of the EIA Directives. Not only 
on an intra-member state level but, in the light of the Espoo Convention on transboundary 
environmental effects,135 also for authorities and the general public in other member states; they have 
an equal right to be informed and to (have a sufficient opportunity to) participate. 
Earlier, reference was made to the Directive on strategic environmental assessment (SEA) which 
requires an impact assessment of plans or programmes likely to have significant effects on the 
environment (arts. 2-4). This assessment is to take place during the preparation of these plans or 
programmes and should result in a report which studies the environmental effects of these proposals 
and ‘reasonable alternatives’ thereto (Art. 5). The Directive also provides for continued monitoring of 
the implementation of these plans or programmes in order to, if necessary, undertake remedial action 
(arts. 10 and 12). 
6.2 Public Access to Environmental Information 
Openness was also the key element in the 1990 Directive on freedom to access information on the 
environment.136 It set out to ensure the freedom of access for any natural or legal person, even without 
having to prove an interest, to information on the environment held by any public authority, also in a 
transboundary respect – given the non-discrimination principle of Article 12 EC and the fact that the 
Directive aimed to guarantee free access to any person ‘throughout the Community’.137 In 2003 this 
Directive was repealed and replaced by a new directive on Public access to environmental 
information.138 This replacement was considered necessary in order to clarify and expand the 
definitions of ‘environmental information’ and ‘public authorities’ (which, in view of Art. 6 EC, does not 
only include authorities with explicit environmental competences), and also to emphasize that the 
directive purports to establish a right to information and that a refusal to disclose information only 
exists in specific and clearly defined cases. 
Article 2 of this Directive offers a broad description of what may be considered to be ‘information 
relating to the environment’: information on the state of the elements of the environment; factors 
(possibly) affecting these elements, measures (possibly) affecting these elements; an analysis of 
these measures; reports on the implementation of environmental legislation; the state of human health 
and safety, the conditions of human life; cultural sites and built structures in as much they are or may 
be affected by these elements or these factors or measures. Only in a limited number of cases can 
access be denied (Art. 4), such as in the case of information that affects national defence or public 
security (§ 2b), which are matters sub judice (§ 2c) and information which is confidential for 
(overriding) commercial or industrial reasons (§ 2d). From the wording of Article 4(1): the ‘member 
states may provide for a request to be refused if [….]’ it follows that member states may decide to 
pursue a more restrictive policy on the non-disclosure of environmental information. With respect to 
enforcing the Directive, its Article 6 states that any applicant (that is to say any natural or legal person) 
                                                 
134 Directive 85/337, (1985) OJ L 175/40, with a major amendment by Directive 97/11, (1997) OJ L 73/14. A 
more recent amendment was made in view of improving access to justice: Directive 2003/35, (2003) OJ L 
156. 
135 Bulletin EC 1/2-1991 (26 February 1991). 
136 Directive 90/313, (1990) OJ L 158/56 (repealed!). 
137 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 333. 
138 See n. 3. 
 22
whose request to access certain information has been refused, has a right to judicial or administrative 
review by an independent and impartial authority under the national legal system. Furthermore, one 
should note that the Directive also has stipulations, in Article 7, concerning the duty to actively provide 
information to the general public, by means such as a periodic publication of ‘the state of the 
environment’. 
Apart from this general – horizontal – Directive on the right of access to information, there are 
many other Directives (like on packaging and packaging waste, on major accidents and on habitats)139 
and also regulations (like on eco-labelling and on the import and export of dangerous chemicals)140 
that contain information requirements.  
 
6.3 European Environment Agency 
Taking the requirements from first pillar of the Arhus Convention one step further, the Regulation on 
the establishment of the European Environment Agency (EEA) tasks the EEA with providing the 
Community and its member states with environmental information which provides a basis for further 
environmental policy making. The information emanating from the EEA can also be brought to the 
attention of the general public. The information is not limited to the present ‘state of the environment’ 
but also concerns scientific research into the foreseeable future. The EEA is to give priority to 
environmental matters of a transboundary, pluri-national and global character. The agency has no 
competence to pursue its own inspections in the member states nor does it have any regulatory 
capacities. 
 
6.4 IPPC; Participation, Access to Justice and NGOs 
 
Bridging openness, participation and judicial review, the Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention 
and Control (IPPC) contains provisions on each of these aspects – especially after the adoption of the 
(amendments by the) Directive on Public Participation etc.141 Articles 15 to 17 (now) contain provisions 
on (improved) access to information and public participation, as well as (newly introduced) provisions 
on access to justice. 
The Directive on Public Participation also purports to enhance participation in a more general 
sense, at least in the context of plans and programmes relating to the environment (following up on 
Art. 6 of the Arhus Convention). Private persons, but also associations, organizations and groups, in 
particular NGOs promoting environmental protection, have the right to an early and effective 
opportunity to participate in a decision-making procedure on the preparation, modification or review of 
certain plans and programmes (listed in a separate Annex) and the public is entitled to express 
comments and opinions, when all options are still open before decisions on the plans and programmes 
are made – Article 2(3). The Directive also (in Art. 3) amends the EIA Directive in view of the 
provisions on access to information, participation, but also on judicial review.  
The aspect of access to justice is the main subject of a Commission proposal for a directive on 
access to justice in environmental matters, aimed at implementing the third pillar of the Arhus 
Convention.142 Although this proposal is based on Article 175 EC the avoidance of disparities is also 
an important motive: enforcement of Environmental Law depends on many factors; lack of 
enforcement is too frequently due to the limitations in the legal standing of persons directly affected as 
                                                 
139 Packaging, Art. 6, section 4, see n. 68; Major Accidents, Art. 13 of Directive 96/82, (1997) OJ L 010/13; 
habitats, Art. 17 of Directive 92/43, (1992) OJ L 206/7. 
140 Labelling, arts. 5, 8 and 10, and annex IV of Regulation 1980/2000, (2000) OJ L 237/1; Import/export, arts. 4 
and 9 of Regulation 2455/92, (1992) OJ L 251/13 (amended). 
141 Directive 2003/35 on Public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes 
relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice directives 
85/337 and 96/61; (2003) OJ L 156. 
142 COM(2003) 624 final. 
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well as of representative associations seeking to protect the environment.143 The proposal focuses on 
the legal acts of public authorities under or obliged by Environmental Law.144 According to Article 6 
natural or legal persons145 can apply for an internal review by a public authority to reconsider such an 
act (or the omission thereof). If this authority fails to meet the time-limits for deciding upon such a 
request or the applicant considers the decision taken not to be in compliance with environmental law, 
he or she is entitled to institute ‘environmental proceedings’ (Art. 7). These can take the form of 
administrative or judicial review procedures, both on procedural and substantive issues, before an 
independent and impartial body established by law, in order to challenge these acts or omissions on 
the ground of a breach of environmental law. As for legal standing, Article 4 points to the need for a 
‘sufficient interest’, or impairment of a right, where the administrative procedural law (of the member 
state involved) requires this as a precondition.  
Especially interesting are the provisions for so-called ‘qualified entities’. In Article 2(1-c) these are 
defined as associations, organizations and groups which have the objective of protecting the 
environment and are recognized as such. Article 8 lists the criteria for the recognition of international, 
national, regional or local associations, organizations or groups. Such an entity: a) must be 
independent, non-profit-making legal persons with a statutory objective to protect the environment; b) 
must have an organizational structure which enables it to ensure the adequate pursuit of its statutory 
objective; c) must be legally constituted and must have worked actively for environmental protection in 
conformity with its statute for a period set by the member state in question (not in excess of 3 years); 
d) must have its annual statement of accounts certified by a registered auditor. Finally, Article 9 
obliges member states to establish a procedure for recognition, either on a ‘case to case basis’ or a 
‘recognition in advance’ procedure. A qualified entity has legal standing in environmental proceedings 
without having to meet the requirements of Article 4, when the matter is covered by the statutory 
activities and the review falls within the geographical area of the activities of the entity.146 
Ensuring legal standing for NGOs can be regarded as an ‘ultimate safeguard’. Ultimate in the 
sense that it is the general view, also shared by the Commission,147 that participation in the decision-
making process by these types of organizations is of the utmost importance to civil society and the 
democratic process.148 For that reason the Commission is involved in funding Environmental NGOs 
(also known as ENGOs) for environmental purposes.149 A special website lists each year’s 
contributions for which ENGOs have applied.150 Meanwhile the eight largest ENGOs in the EU, also 
known as the ‘Green G8’, have become important players in European environmental policy 
making.151 
 
6.5 The Member States’ Perspective 
 
Under § 4.2 we observed that under the framework directives such as on waste, water and air 
pollution the regulatory discretion of member states is included in their obligation to establish 
environmental (implementation) plans and programmes. Similar plans and programmes appear 
                                                 
143 Ibidem, General considerations, § 1.1. 
144 A term defined in Art. 2(1-g). The possibility of judicial action taken against private persons is also 
addressed; see Art. 3 – connecting the proposal to Art. 9(3) of the Arhus Convention. 
145 Art. 2(1-b). 
146 See Art. 5(1). 
147 COM(2000) 11 final, Discussion paper: The Commission and Non-Governmental Organizations: Building a 
stronger partnership. 
148 See also J.H. Jans, supra note 114, p. 55. 
149 See J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 1000. See also: <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environ 
ment/funding/finansup.htm> (dd. 24/02/2003); on the basis of Decision No. 466/2002/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 1 March 2002 laying down a Community action programme promoting non-
governmental organizations primarily active in the field of environmental protection. 
150 See <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/funding/ngo/2003/list03_en.htm>. 
151 See J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 999. See also <http://www.eeb.org/press/Green_G8_on_Con 
vention_29_04_02.pdf> and for active participation: <http://www.eeb.org/press/Green_ 
G8_on_Convention_29_04_02.pdf>. 
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outside framework directives, such as in the Habitats Directive (for special conservation areas). These 
plans and programmes often include room for participation either by the general public or particular 
interested parties. Thus they can add to the element of a more communicative basis for environmental 
policy making. 
Public participation is most clearly present in the environmental permit systems of the member 
states. This coincides with the objectives of the IPPC Directive, but also with the Arhus Convention, 
which is already being implemented in the member states. Some member states have gone as far as 
to allow each member of the public to participate, regardless of his or her own private interest (the 
actio popularis), even though this is not required under the Arhus Convention.152 In some countries 
public participation extends to other instruments, such as the plans and programmes mentioned 
earlier,153 but also to procedures in which an EIA is to be made. The EIA has clearly become an 
important policy instrument in the member states.154 
As far as the implementation of the provisions on judicial review in the Arhus Convention is 
concerned, one can conclude that most member states have administrative courts that deal with 
administrative decisions and in some member states appeals against these types of decisions must be 
brought before the ordinary courts (like in Ireland, the UK and Denmark).155 By and large review takes 
place in conformity with Article 6 ECHR. It is also important to notice that, increasingly, opportunities 
for NGOs to appeal in a court of law are being enlarged, especially with regard to the general 
environmental interest.156 
 
6.6 Summing Up 
 
Considering the Directives on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), on Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA), on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC), on Public access to 
environmental information, on Public participation, the proposal on Access to justice in environmental 
matters, as well as the regulations on the EEA, on Eco-labelling and on Eco-management (EMAS), we 
can conclude that the good governance principles of openness and participation have clearly been 
brought to the foreground of environmental policy making. This observation is supported by many 
examples of clauses and provisions on openness and participation in sectoral (or vertical) directives 
and regulations (such as on habitats and on packaging, to name just two examples). 
Both principles are also clearly present in the environmental law systems of member states. 
Although there are many practical differences – for instance as to who has sufficient standing to 
actually participate in a procedure; nevertheless the basic notions from the Arhus Convention are 
generally adhered to in national environmental law. 
Finally, according to the 5th EAP, openness and participation underpin the notion of 
environmental protection as a ‘shared responsibility’. Furthermore, the 6th EAP states that to ‘Work 
closely with business and consumers to identify solutions’ and to ‘Ensure better and more accessible 
information on the environment for citizens’ remain the focal points in the strategic view on 
environmental policy making. 
 
                                                 
152 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 573. 
153 See, for instance, Austria, in R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 
16 . 
154 Clearly also by virtue of the EC EIA directive (discussed above). 
155 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 577 and: Germany, p. 238; 
the Netherlands, p. 379; the UK, p. 462-463. 
156 Ibidem, p. 581 and: France, p. 192; Italy, p. 309; the Netherlands, 387-388; Spain, 435; the UK, p. 462-463. 
J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 1001. 
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7 A Governance Shift under the New Constitution? 
 
The White Paper’s principles of good governance, as viewed in the ‘World Bank’ perspective on 
governance, match both the cornerstones of environmental legal policy making and the present-day 
legal policy practice in environmental law in Europe. The conviction that environmental protection is a 
shared responsibility and that environmental policies require a ‘joint venture’ between government and 
civil society is sufficiently rooted in the basic legal notions of environmental law to allow for a fruitful, 
reciprocal relationship. 
 
7.1 Following or Setting a Trend? 
 
So, looking back at the last ten years of environmental policy making (from the 5th EAP onwards), we 
find principles of good governance implicitly present in environmental legal policy making in some form 
or another, even before the White Paper was presented. Rather than following a trend it seems that 
environmental legal policy making has, probably amongst other sectors, been a trend-setter; both in 
general strategies and in actual legal policy implementation. That is not to say that the presentation of 
principles of good governance by the Commission in the White Paper is just ‘old news’ as far as the 
environmental sector is concerned. The White Paper lists the principles with respect to its objective of 
a closer relationship between civil society and public authorities on all levels of and within the 
Community. Surely this confirms and indeed underpins the present strategic view on environmental 
legal policy making. Thus the White Paper can serve to strengthen the attempts at a greater use of 
‘horizontal instruments’, that is of closer co-operation with civil society and of instruments that call for a 
greater internalization of the environmental dimensions for all kinds of decisions, both within the public 
and the private realm.  
Having said this, we may ask ourselves whether the notion of good environmental governance, 
as it stands today, offers a true shift in governance. When the Commission states that it aims to 
‘refocus the institutions’, this is to be understood as a ‘Better use of powers [...]’, which is to ‘connect 
the EU more closely to its citizens and lead to more effective policies’.157 This agenda can be pursued 
without any fundamental institutional changes, especially when we merely look at openness and 
participation. On the other hand, when we focus on the element of ‘more effective policies’, the White 
Paper can support the sectoral pressure for new environmental policy instruments, and indeed for a 
true governance shift. 
 
7.2 Barrieres to a Shift in Governance? 
 
Such a shift, however, is hampered by a number of factors, especially by the institutional demands of 
a Single European Market (SEM) and respect for member state sovereignty. 
As to the sovereignty issue, especially when financial instruments are involved, this can be a 
sensitive point. In the earlier mentioned example of environmental taxation (in § 4.4) this is illustrated 
as Article 175(2) EC requires a unanimous decision in the Council in a number of issues, amongst 
which is taxation. For this type of economic instrument to be used more frequently, the decision-
making process is an important barrier.158 Naturally this would not be the case if member states would 
more readily agree to use majority rule. So far that does not seem to be the case, as is also illustrated 
by the fact that under the draft proposal for a European Constitution the same unanimity rule applies – 
much to the regret of, for instance, the Green G8.159 Rittberger and Richardson160 also show how, 
especially – but not only – when the unanimity rule applies, the Commission is forced to apply a 
                                                 
157 White Paper, p. 33 and p. 8. 
158 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 565-566 and p. 571. 
159 See proposal no. 3 in their Statement on the Future of Europe (on the 29th of April 2002) 
<http://www.eeb.org/press/Green_G8_on_Convention_29_04_02.pdf>. 
160 B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note 27, p. 597-601. 
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strategy in which much less ambitious proposals are brought forward than the Commission itself would 
probably like (considering what the Commission has presented on new environmental policy 
instruments in the 5th and 6th EAPs). 
Interestingly enough the issue of sovereignty can also operate as an incentive to harmonization 
in environmental law. The Carbon energy tax, mentioned under § 4.4, is also an example of this, as 
the Commission’s initiative was (also) motivated by fears from some member states of competitive 
disadvantages caused by national tax schemes.161 Again, though, to take the initiative is one thing, but 
to reach agreement was – by the same token of sovereignty – quite another. The question which 
remains is whether in the final analysis the unified tax system offers as much environmental promise 
as national schemes did or would have done. The same question arises in view of voluntary 
agreements. In Germany (EMAS) and in the Netherlands (packaging) voluntary schemes were in 
operation but were pushed aside by harmonization motivated (mainly) by competitive fears.162 
Finally, as we saw, member states’ sovereignty offers little opportunity to introduce new 
environmental policy instruments as a means of implementing of directives, unless the directive allows 
for such discretion.163 
On the issue of the SEM, again we find major barriers to introducing new environmental policy 
instruments. Prior to the 1987 Single European Act, though, striving for an SEM was indeed an 
important drive for environmental legislation. Clearly the use of command and control legislation 
prevailed, however, as this was best suited to economic harmonization.164 Around 1992 the economic 
recession that hit Europe together with the battle for greater European legitimacy (in the aftermath of 
the Maastricht Treaty) urged the Commission to seek new instruments, especially in the environmental 
policy area, that could improve policy efficiency, implementation and greater cost-effectiveness.165 The 
general belief seemed to be that in order to cope with the needs of greater economic growth (in an 
SEM), the old environmental policy instruments would not suffice166 and only through shared 
responsibility, with greater stakeholder involvement, could economic and environmental needs be 
united.  
Having said this, the negative reflex action to the SEM ideal accentuates the fear of economic 
distortions when competitive advantages cause disparities between member states. The prior 
illustrations of member states’ taxation schemes, Eco-labels and voluntary agreements with target 
groups present clear examples of where the Commission took on an entrepreneurial role to protect the 
SEM.167 
The introduction of the IPPC Directive presents an interesting case in view of the SEM argument. 
According to this Directive both quality and emission standards are to be set on the Community level, 
in order to be applied on the member state level, mainly by the process of permitting member states to 
set certain standards. However, in the explanatory memorandum to the original Commission proposal 
for the IPPC Directive, the leading concept was that, on the one hand, there would be harmonized 
quality standards (on the Community level) and, on the other, there would be differentiated emission 
limit values (within the member states). In a later stage of the preparations this proposition was 
abandoned and the directive now contains the following provision in Article 18: ‘Acting on a proposal 
from the Commission, the Council will set emission limit values, in accordance with the procedures laid 
down in the Treaty, for [...] categories of installations listed in Annex I […] and the polluting substances 
referred to in Annex III, for which the need for Community action has been identified.’  
Although the possibility of setting limit values by member states has not been entirely ruled out, 
clearly the directive sets a different tune from that advocated in the memorandum. This centralized 
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allocation of regulatory power seems to be the result of a fear of distorting the internal market through 
the introduction of differentiated emission values.168 
With Faure and Lefevere169 one may wonder why the IPPC framework has not capitalized on the 
notion of a higher allocative efficiency through leaving the competences for emission limit values to the 
member states. Leaving room for differentiated emission limit values offers an opportunity for a 
clustering of preferences and thus for competition between regulatory systems (and their legislative 
authorities).170 If combined with the strict enforcement of quality standards set on the Community level, 
this approach can create efficiency without there being a fear of a ‘race to the bottom’.171 Clearly this 
approach places the ideal of ‘a Europe for citizens’, guaranteeing a similar environmental quality for all 
Europeans, before the objective of creating equal market conditions for all. In the proposed alternative 
these market conditions can differ due to regional differences in the costs that the emission values 
bring about. Some of these limit values will be higher (and thus more costly) because the regional 
circumstances require more stringent limits to comply with the harmonized quality standards. In other 
cases the emission values will be higher (and more costly) because the member state concerned has, 
by its own choice (!), decided to aim for an even higher quality standard (than the harmonized 
minimum).172 Such a practice, however, is only acceptable if our definition of a SEM is less absolute. 
Finally, in terms of barriers to new environmental policy instruments, the rapid ‘change of mind’ in 
the IPPC case raises questions as to the ‘level playing field’ with regard to participation on the EC 
level. In their study Faure and Lefevere wonder if this change has been brought about by pressure 
from industry, wanting emission standards to be set on the EC level. Of course the involvement of 
industry in itself fits perfectly with the White Paper’s viewpoint on promoting participation and also with 
notions of co-regulation. On the other hand, if we consider this matter from the angle of public choice 
theory, could it not be that the private interest perspective of industry has motivated the idea of 
pushing for standard-setting on the Community level, rather than on the level of member states? On 
the central EC level ENGOs still seem to have less influence than on the (sub)national level; 
furthermore, the standard-setting procedure on the EC level is often more depoliticized because the 
comitology procedure is applied.173 
From this point of view the very least that should be considered is to ensure that stakeholders in 
environmental policies have an equal say in the relevant decision-making procedures – on all levels. 
This is all the more relevant as environmental policies are concerned with technical expertise, and 
thus public authorities carry the risk of becoming dependent on know-how and information from 
industry and are, in a sense, ‘captured’ by industry.174 Openness and especially procedural 
transparency can possibly remedy such an occurrence – the draft of the new European Convention 
should contain legal assurances in this respect.175 
All in all this paints a picture in which pressure for the centralized setting of emission limit values 
should be critically looked at – and with that a critical appraisal of the White Paper’s approach to 
participation and openness seems to be in place. 
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7.3 Aspirations for a Shift in European Environmental Governance 
 
It will be clear that the aspects of openness and participation and especially the emancipation of 
ENGOs is of great importance in order to create the type of ‘level playing field’ which is required. Scott, 
Jans and their fellow members in the Avosetta Group (of lawyers in European environmental law) 
point to the need to change Article 230(4) EC.176 Currently access to procedures to object against EC 
Directives and regulations requires legal standing on the basis of ‘direct and individual concern’ a 
general concern for the protection of the environment is considered an insufficient ground for legal 
standing. A change of criteria in the future European Constitution could do a great deal of good in 
emancipating the role of ENGOs on the EC level. 
Secondly, one may wonder how a change in the relationship between the SEM and the ideal of ‘a 
Europe for citizens’, guaranteeing a similar environmental quality for all Europeans, can best be 
brought about.  
One of the key elements to a shift could well lie in the substantive underpinning of environmental 
law in Europe. Earlier (in § 5.1) we looked at the role that environmental principles play as 
benchmarks for environmental policy making. According to Winter, a reformulation of these principles 
in the European Convention, so as to enhance their legal character, is unnecessary.177 Courts and 
legal doctrine have sufficient possibilities to either promote a more restrictive or extensive 
interpretation of the existing principles.178 
A more provocative option would be to introduce a right to a clean environment. Ermacora, 
together with the other members of the Avosetta Group, have formulated a proposal to that extent.179 
The main advantages of such a basic right would be: firstly, to enhance the clarity of the concept itself 
(thereby providing legal certainty); furthermore, to enhance respect for such a right by individuals 
(which would amount to individuals taking EC environmental law more seriously and taking legal 
(court) action to defend their environmental basic right); finally, this right could establish the equal 
ranking of the environmental interest with rights such as the freedom to conduct a business or the right 
to property (arts. 16 and 17 of the Charter) – the emancipatory motive. 
The Avosetta Group proposes the following formulation: 
‘Everyone has the right to a clean natural environment. This right is subject to reasons of overriding 
public interest. It includes the right to participation in decision making, the right of access to the courts 
and the right to information in environmental matters. A high level of environmental protection and the 
improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and 
ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development’. 
The group refers to the fact that such a right has been recognized by the ECHR on various occasions 
and for different legal grounds and also, in some form or another, by many European constitutions. 
This Avosetta initiative coincides with a proposal from the ‘Green G8’: the inclusion of environmental 
rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (to the Treaty).180 
Naturally it remains to be seen whether such a basic environmental right would bring about a shift 
in environmental governance. It would still be questionable whether it would give rise to the notion of 
‘a Europe for citizens’, guaranteeing a similar environmental quality for all Europeans and if it would 
                                                 
176 J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 1001-1002. J.H. Jans, supra note 114, p. 64-66 (also for some relevant case law). 
Avosetta Group, ‘Resolution’, in J.H. Jans (ed.), The European Convention and the Future of European 
Environmental Law, Proceedings of the Avosetta Group of European Environmental Lawyers, Groningen, 
Europa Law Publishing, 2003, p. 121, no. 8. 
177 G. Winter, supra note 114, p. 3-25, especially p. 13. 
178 A more ‘active’ role on the part of the courts could, in a moderate way, bring about something of a shift to 
Court Governance; see the discussion under § 2d. 
179 F. Ermacora, ‘The Right to a Clean Environment in the Constitution of the European Union’, in in J.H. Jans 
(ed.), The European Convention and the Future of European Environmental Law, Proceedings of the 
Avosetta Group of European Environmental Lawyers, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2003, p. 29-42. 
For the resolution of the whole Alvosetta Group on this issue see ibidem p. 119-120. 
180 See the 5th ‘issue for consideration in: <http://www.eeb.org/press/Green_G8_on_Con 
vention_29_04_02.pdf>. 
 29
even leave room for different ways of attaining that level of protection (through emission standards) in 
shared responsibility and possibly in a system that allows for regulatory competition. 
For the moment the present draft for the European Constitution contains few new initiatives for 
environmental policy making. According to Article I.5 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe,181 a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment is still one of 
the main Union objectives. This is reflected in Article II.37 of the draft which stipulates that this 
objective is to be integrated into the policies of the Union and is to be ensured in accordance with the 
principle of sustainable development. Subsequently, Articles III.129-131 of the draft offer the 
operational normative foundations (such as more specified objectives, principles, instruments and 
procedures – very much like the present Articles 174-176 EC-Treaty) for the Union’s environmental 
policy undertakings. Finally, Article I.13 of the draft refers to the ‘Environment’ as one of the principle 
areas of shared competence between the Union and its Member States. 
 So the Convention offers no explicit initiatives for new environmental policy instruments. Maybe 
we should take this as confirmation of the leading notion in the 6th EAP, and the preceding 
environmental policy practice. In their 2003 article Rittberger and Richardson wanted to discover, ‘[…] 
whether the alleged shift in the Commission’s environmental ‘policy style’, from a traditional regulatory 
style towards a new style based on less impositional, more market based a co-operative instruments 
has actually occurred in practice’.182 On the ‘declaratory level’ they analysed what the Commission 
had announced in the field of legal environmental policy making. In comparing the 4th and 5th EAP on 
three key issues (external integration, participation and new instruments), through a statistically aided 
analysis (on key words per issue), they found a change towards innovation through new style 
instruments (although the analysis also showed that, even in the 5th EAP, the Commission was never 
willing to ‘throw out the baby with the bathwater’).183 In their analysis of the ‘operational level’ they 
focussed on three areas: water policy, waste policy and atmospheric pollution. In all areas they found 
that in at least 50 percent of all Commission proposals for legislation in the period between 1994 and 
2000, command and control instruments were advocated.184 Still, in all of these instances there are 
also examples of supplementary ‘new style’ legislation, albeit only limited.  
In their final analysis Rittberger and Richardson assume that the Commission is acting 
‘strategically’, looking for a balance between the existing rules, the main policy trends (including 
possible changes in rules) and stakeholders’ interests. Alternatively they reason that the Commission 
operates on the basis of a ‘risk avoidance strategy’. Convinced as the Commission may be of the need 
for new policy instruments, it is also fully aware of the need to retain the key elements of the old style 
instruments.185 Along this strand the nature of each separate environmental problem also plays an 
important role: ‘different problems might require different tools’.186 Clearly problems involving serious 
risks to human health will still warrant a command and control response (if only for political reasons). 
Again in this view the 6th EAP is more balanced than the 5th EAP and the old style instruments are still 
very much alive. 
 
7.4 Summing Up 
 
According to Fiorino187 governance literature suggests that there are common stages through which 
nations progress as they learn to cope with environmental problems. Most countries initially apply an 
approach which relies on direct regulation for pollution sources and gradually progress to more 
complex strategies, with a broader range of instruments and more reliance on cooperative 
relationships between stakeholders: ‘this progression may be seen as one from substantive to 
                                                 
181 18 July 2003 
182 B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note 27, p. 575. 
183 Ibidem, p. 581-587. 
184 Ibidem, p. 591 (water); p. 593 (waste) and p. 594-597 (atmospheric/air). 
185 Ibidem, p. 598. 
186 Ibidem, p. 601-602. 
187 D.J. Fiorino, supra note 132, p. 467. 
 30
reflexive law; from hierarchical-adversarial to social-political governance; and from more technical to 
conceptual and social learning.’ The evolutionary lesson to be learned in Environmental Legal Policies 
is that ‘as the world changes, patterns of law and governance must change with it’.188 
Clearly the White Paper and environmental law in Europe are in tune with this statement and join 
in the Commission’s attempt to bring about these necessary changes. On the one hand, at the 
declaratory level, the relevant policy documents almost seem to overstretch the operational, political 
and institutional possibilities. Then again, on the other hand, both the White Paper and the strategic 
environment documents (such as the EAPs) do not aim for a revolutionary shift in governance, but 
merely for a turn to good governance: aiming for closer relations between governments in Europe and 
civil society, or likewise, for shared responsibility in environmental protection. 
Given these ambitions, surely environmental law in Europe is already a case of ‘work in 
progress’. Environmental policy instruments will continually have to be adjusted to changes, both in 
relation to technical and to socio-political developments. Still, however, the question remains whether 
effective and efficient environmental policies require a genuine adjustment of existing institutional 
structures – indeed a shift in European governance. On a number of issues there seems to be a 
(academic) push for such a change. 
– Firstly, the issue of introducing a basic right to a clean environment; to truly involve private citizens’ 
interest in European environmental law. This could be supplemented with a policy to further the use 
of provisions with direct effect, thus enabling citizens to directly appeal for their enforcement.189 
– Secondly, the issue of strengthening the legal position of ENGOs, especially on the EC level, 
alongside improved transparency in decision making (again especially on the EC level). 
– Thirdly, the issue of placing a ‘Europe of citizens’, in terms of guaranteed minimum environmental 
quality, before the protection of the SEM, in terms of equal conditions for competition. 
Clearly the last-mentioned issue not only appeals to ‘idealist’ convictions for emancipating the 
environmental interest, but it also appeals to our willingness and readiness for genuine institutional 
change. A change that may not require a legal reform of institutions, but that will most certainly require 
a change in legal policies with regard to relations between the EC level and the member states. In 
allowing (moderate) regime competition,190 such an approach could pave the way to expanding the 
possibilities for the use of more horizontal instruments (such as environmental agreements). 
Furthermore, participation by civil society would stand to gain as more decision-making processes 
would take place ‘closer to home’. Finally, putting a ‘Europe of and for citizens’ before other 
considerations could contribute to bridging the facilitative and the harmonization arenas so as to 
advance political transfer.191 
The assignment underlying some to the contributions of this book is to look for ‘lessons from national 
law’ with regard to good governance in the EU/EC. A first lesson on the basis of the prior analysis of 
environmental law in Europe could be that as good governance reflects primarily the principles of 
openness and participation, a critical appraisal of decision making is warranted on the basis of public 
choice theory and on the need for balancing institutional powers by basic citizens’ rights (both 
substantive and procedural, including legal standing for groups, associations and organizations) – on 
all levels.192 A second lesson could be to evaluate governance by putting more trust in what is to be 
gained by the diversity that Europe represents and acting in a less protective way in view of both the 
SEM and member states’ sovereignty (as a concept to shield against competition). Thus arrangements 
concerning co-regulation and self-regulation could proliferate over various levels of government, 
resulting in a closer and more widespread involvement of citizens (both individually and in groups), 
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associations and organizations, throughout European civil societies. Much is still to be gained by 
working more closely through pluri-formity. 
